Gorbachev on Karabakh Conflict

Gorbachev on Karabakh Conflict

An inside look at the events.


Mikhail Gorbachev, MEMOIRS. 769pp.
New York and London: © 1996 Doubleday

     
THE KARABAKH EXPLOSION [pp. 333-340]
     
In February 1988 the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast 
(which was 85-per-cent Armenian) of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist 
Republic demanded that it be made a part of the Armenian Soviet Social 
Republic. A resolution was passed by the oblast Soviet and immediately 
supported by thousands of people at demonstrations and meetings in Armenia. 
 These demonstrations were carried out in an organized way, without 
excesses.  The marches carried large posters supporting perestroika and 
glasnost.  Law-enforcement agencies only maintained order, without taking 
stronger measures_anyway, there was little they could have done against 
this sea of people.
     
This produced a sharp response in Azerbaijan, where mass meetings were 
likewise held, this time directed against Armenia. 
     
In February the Politburo examined the Nagorno-Karabakh question. We 
received information about the position of the leaders of the republics.  
The Azerbaijan leader, [Kiamran] Bagirov, insisted that Moscow should 
guarantee the unchanged status of Nagorno-Karabakh.  The Armenian leader, 
[Karen] Denmirtchyan [sic], suggested that the appeal of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh oblast Soviet should be considered in the Supreme Soviets 
of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Soviet Union.  It became clear that the 
arguments between Baku and Yerevan over Stepanakert would have to be 
resolved by Moscow.
     
[Nikolai] Ryzhkov said that we must `act in accordance with the 
Constitution'. [Vikyor] Chebrikov reported that these events were having a 
bad effect in other republics.  In Estonia there was a growing sentiment in 
favour of leaving the Union. Tajikistan was debating its claim to Bukhara 
and Samarkand.
     
I believed that the problem had to be resolved by political means, that the 
Central Committee should declare any change of borders unacceptable, and 
that we needed to draft economic, social and cultural proposals aimed at 
improving the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.  We should let the Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis get together and decide the status of Nagorno-Karabakh for 
themselves, and we ought to accept any decision they made.  I felt that the 
Russian intelligentsia and workers should join in their discussions.  We 
decided to send Politburo representatives to both republics to lend 
assistance to the local leadership. [Yegor] Ligachev and [Georgy] 
Razumovsky flew to Baku, and [Aleksandr] Yakovlev and [Vladimir] Dolgikh to 
Yerevan.  Their mission was to establish contacts and reassure the people 
in those republics.
     
On 26 February I appealed to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia, asking 
them to show understanding, responsibility and prudence.  I said that we 
would not sidestep frank discussions of various proposals, but that this 
must be done calmly, within the framework of the democratic process and 
legality.
     
My speech contributed to some normalization.  The continuous mass meetings 
in Yerevan stopped, and reassured people returned to their homes.  I tried 
to get a dialogue going and explore ways of finding a compromise, which I 
was firmly convinced was the only way out of the situation.
     
The dispute over Karabakh goes into the distant past. From time immemorial 
two peoples have lived side by side on this fertile land.  It passed from 
hand to hand; for centuries it was part of Persia.  But mainly it was 
populated by Armenians.  Immediately after the [Bolshevik] revolution their 
ancient dram of reunification with the motherland almost came true.  
However, although the Azerbaijani leader of that time, Nariman Narimanov, 
initially gave his concent to this, he soon rescinded it.  Afterwards, the 
question was raised many time, including after the war, but was never 
resolved.  The result was that almost 500,000 Armenians lived in 
Azerbaijan, mainly in Karabakh, while 200,000 Azerbaijanis lived in 
Armenia.  First of all, we had to address practical problems.  Soon after 
the unrest started, a resolution was adopted to provide assistance to 
Nagorno-Karabakh, calling for 400 million rubles to be allotted for 
emergency needs there.  Initially, this made a strong impression, but after 
two or three months, we began to receive indications that the authorities 
in Azerbaijan were distributing the monies from the centre according to 
their own wishes, with only a small part reaching the intended recipients.  
We had to send commissions to verify these assertions.  It appeared, 
however, that most of the needs of the local people had indeed been met. 
     
If this had been done ten years earlier, if [Geidar ] Aliyev had conducted 
a valid internationalist policy, a catastrophe could have been prevented.  
By 1988 it was already too late.
     
Events snowballed.  Acts of violence broke out, the peak being the bloody 
pogrom of 27-29 February against Armenians in Sumgait, where there was a 
large number of Azerbaijani refugees.
     
Troops were sent in.  Unarmed soldiers tried to bring the brutal hooligans 
to their senses. Many young soldiers were wounded, some permanently 
disabled.  However, I believe the consequences would have been even more 
severe if the soldiers had been armed.
     
We have often been reproached for `showing weakness'.  But when we were 
forced to bring in the militia and military units to avoid further 
bloodshed, we again fell under fire of criticism, this time for using 
force.  There is no doubt that the government had to act in the way they 
did.  Extreme measures were due to extreme circumstances.  The same thing 
would have been done in any democratic state.
     
The massacres in Sumgait produced universal outrage, everyone was shaken.  
At the same time, sympathy was shown in the Muslim republics for the people 
of their faith.  Events threatened to get out of control.
     
The question of Nagorno-Karabakh was considered at the an extraordinary 
Politburo meeting on 3 March, where I noted that the situation had reached 
a critical stage, that we had been late in dealing with Sumgait and had 
underestimated its implications.
     
`Protective measures may be required,' said I, `in order to prevent loss of 
life, as occurred in Sumgait.  The main thing is to use political methods.  
However, authority must always be authority.  And when it must be used, it 
must be used in time. The law must rule.'
     
I demanded that those responsible should be swiftly brought to justice, and 
that steps must be taken so that chaos would not `spill over' again.  
However, I also demanded that we avoid further attempts at a `quick fix' in 
favour of working together patiently with our Armenian and Azerbaijani 
comrades.
     
Even before these tragic events I had a fairly complete picture of the 
sources of the conflict.  Let us recall that the Armenians had suffered 
both from Persians and from Turks.  Could they really erase from their 
memory the genocide of 1915, when the Turks slaughtered a million and a 
half Armenians and scattered two million through the world?  Eventually 
they turned to Russia, not out of love for their tsar, but in the hope of 
safety.  They came to the Russian people for protection.
     
But the roots of the Azeris in Karabakh also went deep.  Lenin had 
understood the complexity of this problem and commissioned [Georgy] 
Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to look into the 
matter.  Under Stalin those wo were in charge of nationality affairs lacked 
subtlety.  Problems and difficulties accumulated over the decades.  The 
Azerbaijan leadership did not treat the Karabakh population in the spirit 
of the traditions of Lenin, and sometime they simply acted in an inhumane 
way.  Problems of language and culture arose, and serious mistakes were 
made in the cadre policy.  All of this was brought to light under glasnost. 
 Problems quickly came to a head.
     
In both republics many highly placed officials had soiled themselves by 
corruption.  But when perestroika began and they sensed that the ground was 
shaking under them, it was these elements who tried to provoke ethnic 
conflicts.  The national feelings of people became the object of merciless 
exploitation.  In their hands Karabakh was a mine lad underneath 
perestroika.
     
We decided: (1) to publish our analysis of the situation in the press; (2) 
that the General Secretary should speak on television; (3) the question 
should be taken up in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; (4) the 
report of the procurator's office on the investigation of the events in 
Sumgait should be published; (5) administrative agencies were to decide on 
the stationing of troops at flash points, but without imposing a curfew.
     
The Azerbaijan and Armenian leaders were again told to come to an 
understanding.  This they were unable to do.  Again the question was sent 
back to us for a decision.
     
At the Politburo session of 6 July 1988, I expressed the opinion that some 
people in the higher levels of power in the republics were fanning the 
flames and igniting passions.  `The one thing that we can never agree to is 
to support one people to the detriment of another,' I said.  `We must never 
be blackmailed into this.  We will not permit, we must in no case allow the 
truth to be sought through blood!'
     
Under pressure from public opinion, the deputies of the Armenian Supreme 
Soviet resolved to agree to the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, 
and asked the USSR Supreme Soviet to consider this matter.  Two days later 
the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet declared this to be unacceptable, and 
announced measures to accelerate the social and economic development of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  On 25 June public meetings were held in Stepanakert.  
The people were angry that the local press had not reported the February 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Soviet concerning its exit from 
Azerbaijan.
     
Tension grew rapidly.  Meetings and strikes in Stepanakert continued.  
Then, on 6 July, the airport in Yerevan was blockaded.  The 
Nagorno-Karabakh oblast Soviet again passed a resolution `on withdrawal', 
but in Baku it was again declared to be illegal. 
     
What could we do?  What was the way out of the situation?  [Andrei] Gromyko 
suggested the usual solution: `The army will appear on the street and order 
will be restored immediately.'  [Viktor] Chebrikov objected.  Yakovlev 
proposed that the administration of Nagorno-Karabakh should be transferred 
to Moscow.  [Eduard] Shevardnadze was in favour of immediately giving 
Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous republic status.  Ligachev tried to synthesize 
all of these ideas: `There are already 20,000 refugees.  People are 
homeless.  If republic status for Nagorno-Karabakh does not help, we must 
bring in the troops, dismantle factories, dismiss the Party organizations 
and Soviet executive committees and establish order.' 
     
I supported the proposal to set up an autonomous republic, but I felt that 
this matter had to be resolved by the conflicting sides themselves.
     
The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet met on 18 July. All parties were 
invited to present their views.  The session was broadcast on television, 
so that everyone's position would be clear to the general public.  Our 
position--that of the central authorities--was supported by most people. 
     
`How do you wish to solve this problem? I asked. `Victory at any price? 
Armenia wants to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh.  Azerbaijan does not intend 
to allow this and will not yield even a millimetre.  This is all 
unrealistic!  We must find a compromise that will suit everyone.  Only a 
common victory will be a real victory.  You cannot resolve issues while you 
are fighting one another.  This is a political blind alley.  Sumgait and 
other events concerning Nagorno-Karabakh have already made a deep imprint 
on the relations between the two peoples and it will take time for this to 
be smoothed over even a little.  But even so, we must meet each other half 
way and find a compromise.'
     
Suggestions were made at the meeting for strengthening the guarantees to 
the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh in order to prevent a repetition of the 
violence.  In the past there had been many promises, but they had turned 
out to be hallow - essentially a fraud.  I proposed that a special 
commission for consideration of all proposals be set within the framework 
of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.  This 
commission was created and carried out useful work.  Rasul Gamzatov's 
speech made a strong impression on me.  He proposed that the administration 
of Nagorno-Karabakh be transferred temporarily to the Union's central 
agencies.  Subsequently, the commission of the Council of Nationalities put 
forward the very same proposal.
     
On 20 July the resolution of the Presidium, reiterating that a change of 
boundaries was impossible, was published.  On 26 July the Party Central 
Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a resolution to send 
an emissary, Arkady Volksky, to Nagorno-Karabakh.  However, the situation 
did not normalize.  On 21 September a state of emergency was declared and a 
curfew was put into effect in Stepanakert and the Agdam districts. 
     
After the autumn session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 3 December I met 
with deputies from Azerbaijan and Armenia and the leaders of both republics 
and Nagorno-Karabakh.  Ryzhkov, Slyumkov, Chebrikov, Lukyanov and 
Razumovsky were also present.  `We are on the brink of diaster,' I told 
them. `You, the respected representatives of the two peoples, must sit down 
and together find a way out of this mess.'
     
....[Discussion of the earthquake in Armenia]
     
Today I am even more convinced that the nationality issue can never be 
resolved by force.  The tsars fought wars for decades in North Caucasus, 
creating a system of fortresses, Cossack settlements, punishing, 
threatening, destroying, and all to naught, for nothing good came form all 
this. The only positive results came from trade, co-operation among 
peoples, the establishment of an alliance with the ruling elite and tribal 
elders, which brought them closer to the tsar's court, honours and 
privileges.  A kind of new association developed after the October 
Revolution.  In spite of all the faults of this union, a certain balance of 
interests was preserved.
     
The peacemaking process was extremely complicated.  It was even made more 
difficult by, among other things, the general atmosphere that had developed 
in the country, in the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and Russia.  Essentially, 
there were two positions.  One was that the moment the conflict developed - 
especially after the events in Sumgait - it was necessary to strike 
decisively against the `instigators' of the disturbances in Nagorno-Karabakh 
and nip the riots in the bud.  The other position was to ask: since the 
people of Karabakh wished to reunite with their motherland, and we 
recognized the right of nations to self-determination, why not allow this?  
After all, the Nakhichevan autonomous republic is a part of Azerbaijan, even 
though separated from Azerbaijan by Armenian territory.  The 
Nagorno-Karabakh question could be solved in exactly the same way.
     
At some point it seemed that a possible solution was to give Karabakh, like 
Nakhichevan, the status of autonomous republic, while keeping it as part of 
Azerbaijan.  There was a time when this proposal was on the point of being 
implemented.  However, it was just at this moment that the Supreme Soviet 
in Yerevan passed a resolution to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh as part of 
Armenia and so everything fell apart.  It fell apart because of internal 
antagonism, because the battle for power, for replacement of the ruling 
elite, was already in full swing there.  If fell apart because the Armenian 
national movement, which was formed on the basis of the Karabakh committee, 
was in a hurry to seize power.
     
In this connection another possibility was mentioned in the Politburo 
meeting: the central authorities should use the armed forces to preserve 
the status quo.  In other words, preserve the status quo in favour of 
Azerbaijan; at least this would be done not by Azeri extremists, but by 
forces of legitimate power.  I asked my colleagues: `OK, so we introduce 
rule from the centre. The what?' I did not get a clear answer.
     
Some members were very strongly in favour of `imposing order'.  Under such 
conditions it was not easy to defend my position.  Nevertheless, I held to 
it from beginning to end, even though in extreme cases we were unable to 
avoid strictly limited harsh measures. 
     
During this time, 1987-8, I strove to work out a uniform democratic approach 
to disputes between nationalities.  The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh did 
not at all push into the background other, seemingly more tranquil, but no 
less significant processes which were gaining strength in the Baltic 
republics, Moldova and Georgia, and which have begun in Central Asia and in 
Ukraine.  Issues such as the languages of indigenous people, economic 
sovereignty, and expanding rights were raised more and more frequently in 
various regions.  To counter Russification, people often went to the other 
extreme, thus introducing a spirit of confrontation into the mass 
consciousness.  However, in 1987 no-one raised the question of withdrawal 
>from the Union except, perhaps, for extremist groups such as the Estonian 
independence association, J. Barkans's group in Latvia, and certain 
nationalist groups in Lithuania.
     
But we were unable to achieve harmony of interests, where should the way 
out be sought?  In patiently and persistently working for the achievement 
of a compromise, but mainly in changing the very conditions that produced 
the conflict.   Indeed I believed that a lasting solution to the problems 
between nationalities could be found only in the general context of 
economic and political reform.  By the end of my time as President I had no 
doubt that preservation and renewal of the Union could keep the peace.
     
A formula was put forward: `A strong centre and strong republics.'  Others 
expressed it differently: `Strong republics and a strong centre.'  Either 
way, it basically comes down to the same.  After all, the new centre was to 
be formed on different foundations, to deal with issues such as security, 
co-ordination of the fundamentals of economic and social policy, 
co-ordination of foreign policy, maintaining order at borders, and so forth. 
 And, of course, playing the role of arbiter when conflicts arose. 
     
[...]

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